III. Response to the comments made by Victor Ginsburgh

B r u s s e l s S t u d i e s d e b a t e s
The Double vision series is a compilation of articles for debate which bring together academics from different disciplines to provide converging or diverging views of the same issue.
Institutional design for the Brussels area and values for the Belgian community Translation: Gail Ann Fagen This paper is a response to a challenging invitation 1 to "rethink radically (…) not shying away from spelling out the values and objectives which prospective reforms are meant to serve". I deal here with three issues that are problematic for Belgium, providing a rethink of the proposed radical approach by focussing on values that we all hopefully share within the Belgian community. On the basis of these three issues, I
arrive at one precise and well-defined proposal for institutional reform in the Brussels area, a proposal whose "radical" nature derives, I believe, from the values that I shall raise.
Unlocking the majority rule vs. democracy quandary in Belgium's overlapping constituencies
Democracy is one of these values. "One person, one vote" is a summative description, however a fuller description is gained from viewing democracy as an institution of collective choice that aims to achieve the best adequacy of social outcomes vis-à-vis the people's preferences. Condorcet's paradox and Arrow's theorem notwithstanding, majority rule remains the most common way of implementing democratic values, and my intention is not to question this. However, majority rule is not without its flaws, mainly because when a majority exists, there is also a minority whose preferences are not retained in the collective decision that a majority vote leads to. Majority rule is thus a quite imperfect way of implementing democracy. My point here is that this flaw is exacerbated within a multi-layered governmental structure, such as in a federation, where constituencies overlap each other or, more precisely, where larger constituencies encompass smaller constituencies. The exacerbation I have in mind occurs in the following way: when, in a larger constituency, a minority is at the same time a majority in a smaller sub-constituency, blinkered use of the majority rule within the encompassing constituency, on issues that are of concern to the majority in the smaller, encompassed constituency, appears to seriously go against the democratic principle of adequacy vis-à-vis the people's preferences. When a majority on one smaller level can only be a minority on another larger level, institutions that impose the will of the larger constituency's majority upon the smaller constituency's majority serves to induce an inescapable feeling of dictatorship.
In fact, there are two conflicting majorities at stake in this case; each being an expression of preferences, but both being flawed. Reference to the B.H.V. imbroglio should be clear here. The way out of this quandary is, I believe, to call upon the subsidiarity principle, which essentially consists of recognising "local" preferences as being primary ones, and establishing constituencies so as to allow expression of these preferences, and to make decisions accordingly.
Let us apply these considerations to the use of languages in local (i.e. communal) affairs within our country, particularly around Brussels. Reverting, as I have done, to the fundamental value of democracy, which is understood as adequacy vis-à-vis the people's preferences, I can only conclude on this point with the radical institutional proposal that the use of languages 2 at the local level be decided by majority vote 3 within each commune, and no longer by either the federal parliament or a regional parliament.
Unlocking the rigidities of the "unilinguistic" territoriality principle
Apart from subsidiarity, there is also another principle floating around in some of the Belgian intelligentsia, namely the so-called "territoriality principle". In 2004, Philippe Van Parijs produced the best research paper 4 I know of about the institutional aspects of the use of languages within European societies. This paper was remarkably supplemented in 2008 by another 5 , which was directly addressed to the Flemish community, dealing with the issues concerning Brussels. I urge you to read these two papers, firstly because they express (better than anyone has ever done before) constructive and substantial ideas that I strongly agree with, but also because they contain one thesis that I equally strongly disagree with, for the very fundamental reasons that lie at the heart of this present paper. Brussels Studies the e-journal for academic research on Brussels
2
The issue is as follows. Philippe Van Parijs is rightly concerned about the protection of those languages that are under threat of disappearing through being dominated by other languages. He searches for means for ensuring their protection. Among these means -the majority of which I subscribe to -there is one that I am not able to accept, namely the one summarised by an expression he uses as a subtitle in his 2004 paper, "Grab a territory" 6 , which is to make it unilingual and use the encompassing majority to establish institutions that would keep the state of affairs like this forever, no matter how local majorities may evolve.
But when institutions are established at some point in time (admittedly by democratic use of the majority rule) for the purpose of enforcing the territoriality principle in a unilinguistic way, regardless of the linguistic heterogeneity of the local population, is it not evident that the country is bound at some time to run head-on into the democracy quandary that I have just discussed? Many of our fellow citizens have sincerely considered that fixing a linguistic border for good would be a reasonable solution to our institutional problems. We are today learning that the problem lies in the "for good" terms. This is because life causes people and societies to change over time, and institutions should follow life. I believe that the temporal rigidity of the unilinguistic territoriality principle goes against democratic values.
To illustrate this point, allow me to refer to an interesting presentation 7 about the territoriality principle that I recently heard in Louvain-la-Neuve, and how it is institutionalised in the linguistic arrangements of the Graubünden canton in Switzerland. The conclusion that clearly emerged is that for the "principle" to serve its purpose over time -that is, to ensure the survival of Romansh language -and to do so democratically, the canton does forego unilingualism and is moving, through appropriate voting procedures and to a reasonable extent, towards multilingualism. In other words, rigid unilingual territoriality and democracy have been experienced in the case of Graubünden as being incompatible and the values of democracy have received priority over lexicographic unilinguistic preferences. And, it is within this setting that Romansh survives pretty well.
Other examples abound: Singapore, with its four official languages of Chinese, Malay, Tamil and English; and, what a surprise, the Brussels Region itself, which is officially bilingual; consider also Luxembourg, where three languages are spoken, and all survive. All of these examples, and many others reveal the multilingual territoriality principle in action! By contrast, wherever droit du sol/grondrecht is invoked -be it for linguistic or other reasons -endless conflicts prevail.
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Unlocking the zero-sum game quandary generated by our outdated 1962 linguistic laws
Let me now call upon another distinguished colleague of ours, Mark Eyskens, who is also a Minister van State and who published a column in the Trends-Tendances 8 business magazine a few weeks ago in which he advocates designing institutions that would have properties of "non zero-sum games", thereby offering ground for cooperative behaviours that are potentially beneficial to all.
I was most pleased when reading this, because in saying so, he implicitly adopted a thesis that I had put forward a few months earlier in Leuven 9 , namely that our current institutions are of the same logical nature as a zero-sum game because of the territoriality principle 10 implemented in a restrictive way through unilingualism.
The zero-sum game component comes from the close connection established between the territory of a constituency and the people of only one of the linguistic communities that live within it. Hence, if a minority emerges (not to mention a majority!) and asks for public support for some legitimate aspects of its social life, granting such support or recognition is perceived as a loss by those who consider themselves to be owners of the ground and who have a (democratically flawed) institution at their disposal that makes them feel entitled to regulate social life entirely according to their own will.
I now think that this situation is a result of a disputable interpretation of the linguistic laws of 1962, often called the (Gaston) Eyskens and Gilson laws. Beyond the formal definition of the four linguistic regions (in article 4 of the current version of our Constitution) -which was quite necessary to do 11 -the largely Flemish politicians and commentators later gradually attached a notion to this structure of collective belonging of the geographic area to a linguistic subgroup of people living within it, regardless of how these people may evolve. It is this unilateral interpretation of our laws, not the laws themselves, that have introduced a zero-sum game component in the functioning of our institutions, which serves as an inherent source of conflict 12 . 10 EYSKENS 2008 only invokes "nationalism" as inducing zero-sum game type institutions. But this weakens the argument by making it very general and not precise enough. My point is that the specific strategy of associating unilingualism with a territory -the "grabbing" strategy -is the source of our institutional quandary. I propose below a specific counter-strategy against this strategy, with precise institutional content. I do not know which institutions to propose against nationalism.
11 Including well-defined procedures to modify the Regions' frontiers, that is, and more importantly, the belonging of communes to one or another linguistic Region.
12 And many subsequent unilateral decisions taken by the Flemish section of the Raad van State have reinforced this evolution, giving it an understandably disputed "legal" status (as e.g. with the so-called "circular" Peeters of 1997).
Henry Tulkens, "Institutional design for the Brussels area and values for the Belgian community", comments of Victor Ginsburgh, Brussels Studies, Issue 26, 25 may 2009, www.brusselsstudies.be To unlock the situation, and move (as recommended by our colleague, Mark Eyskens and following my appeal to his colleagues in Leuven) towards institutions having the properties of positive sum games, I want to clearly state here that the appropriate way to do so would be to remove the cause of the block, namely unilingualism and "ground grabbing", and to substitute this with an official bilingual status within the communes whenever a reasonable local 13 majority requests this change to be made.
It would be simply dishonest to pretend that adopting bilingual status as an alternative to unilingual status (which is typically Flemish around Brussels) would mean "verfransing" (Francization) of the communes involved. Flemish is more prevalent within the existing 19 communes than it has been for many decade, as substantiated by unquestioned statistical evidence reported in JANSSENS 2008. Efforts aimed at promoting Flemish are usually well received. People do not object to it, and bilingualism works pretty well. Cultural life either in Flemish alone or in both languages is flourishing. Therefore, one can hardly have sympathy for those who would feel a loss each time a unilingual commune were to become bilingual as a result its inhabitants voting for this 14 .
Finally, this is surely the place to note that the main linguistic problems that plague the political life of our country are NOT within the officially bilingual 19 communes of the Brussels Region. They are concentrated in the Brussels vicinity where locally enforced unilingualism only results from an outside majority imposing its will on the local majorities, thereby inducing conflict. Instead, and as we learn from the experience of the 19 communes, a bilingual status induces peaceful coexistence, opening the door for voluntary cooperation that is based on tolerance and mutual respect rather than on discrimination and exclusion.
Summary and conclusion: abandon the "droit du sol/grondrecht"
In response to Paul De Grauwe and Philippe Van Parijs who have asked us "to spell out values and objectives which prospective reforms are meant to serve", I propose that the following hierarchy of values be considered: (1) subsidiarity to resolve the situation when the multi-layer majority rule leads to an impasse; (2) democratic mulBrussels Studies the e-journal for academic research on Brussels 5 13 Note: the request and the choice should be made by a vote within the communes, NOT by a global vote within the whole region (e.g. the Flemish region…), for reasons that should be evident from the argument developed in Section 1 above. This is to obviate the usual objections voiced against "referenda" in Belgium. In the same spirit, there is no question here of making the whole of Belgium bilingual -an idea which also runs against the arguments in Section 1 above. Historically, as my colleague Jacques Thisse once rightly pointed out to me, the unilingual choice of French by the Walloons in the 1930s was not at all directed against the Flemish but is readily explained by the fact that the local languages at that time were Walloon and NOT French -so that French was already a second language to be acquired; Flemish would have been a third language that the population would have had to learn. tilingualism instead of defensive unilinguistic protection; (3) cooperative non territorygrabbing institutions instead of conflicting zero-sum game territorial organisation.
The implied institutional message is therefore as follows: a fundamental reform that the Belgian community urgently requires is to abandon the "droit du sol/grondrecht" -that is, to abandon the notion 15 that in our multicultural country, a territory belongs to a single community (in this case, a linguistic community), with its implication of unilingualism -and to replace it by the idea 16 that for each local constituency (each commune), the language or languages that have official status are those chosen by a reasonable proportion of its inhabitants. Institutionally, this would transform the zero-sum game of exclusion that is present in our current institutions into a positive sum game of cooperation among individuals who effectively respect each other, irrespective of whether they speak, practice and wish to live with one, two or more languages 17 .
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The idea that nationalism is created by the political elite (as my French-speaking friends often claim) has been called into question by a good number of historians. For example, Hobsbawm states that nations are "dual phenomena, constructed essentially from above, but which cannot be understood unless also analyzed from below, that is in terms of the assumptions, hopes, needs, longings and interests of ordinary people." 2 It is thus wrong to consider that a handful of politicians can move a whole population. People follow only if they are sensitive to what their leaders say, but they can also take the lead. The Battle of the Golden Spurs -and its later exploitation -was popularised by Hendrik Conscience who, while his early poems were written in French, in 1838 published De Leeuw van Vlaanderen of de Slag der Gulden Sporen in Flemish, because he had realised the low esteem held of the Flemish language.
I do not think the situation has changed much since 1838. While 59% of the Flemings know French, only 19% of the Walloons know Dutch. The situation is brighter in Brussels where 96% of its residents speak French and 59% speak Flemish. 3 Unfortunately the data available do not indicate how many of the latter are of French-speaking origin (a good example of why the language section of the census would be useful). The current knowledge of Flemish among young Frenchspeakers does not point towards any great changes in the years to come.
These considerations lead me to think that the proposals by my colleague Tulkens, as generous as they may be, are hardly realistic. 4 They are probably a bit late in coming because the French-speakers have taken their time, too much time (Conscience's Leeuw van Vlaanderen was written 171 years ago), and it appears that they still have not understood, and even less accepted, that Flanders has become a nation. I will address his proposals one by one.
(a) In the Flemish communes that surround Brussels, the use of languages should be put to a majority vote by the population of each commune.
The United States is home to some 10 million Poles (immigrants or of Polish ancestry), and only 660,000 of them still speak Polish at home. Why were 94% of these Poles able to learn English? Over a million of them live in Chicago, and they make up 12% of the population of Greater Chicago. Of course they are not spread evenly throughout the city, but live in so-called "Polish patches", some of which have a population as large as that of the communes in the outskirts of Brussels. Imagine a vote in each one of these "patches" that would allow the Poles, if they attained the majority, to file their tax returns in their mother tongue, if they still knew it. 5
(b) Philippe Van Parijs suggests that a community should "grab a territory", and turn it into a unilingual entity if it holds the majority and than hang on to it "forever". Henry Tulkens proposes to abandon the principle of unilingual territory when the linguistic majority changes. I propose that those who belong to the linguistic minority learn the language of the majority, even if they do not speak it at home (because quite reasonably they want their children to be bilingual). And matters will be arranged consensually, even if, eventually they become the linguistic majority.
(c) Marc Eyskens and Henry Tulkens suggest that the nature of the linguistic "game" played by the Flemish in the communes with French-speaking residents, through lack of coordination, leads to a zero-sum quandary. They feel it would benefit both communities if the French-speaking culture were allowed to flourish in the Flemish region, and even supported on the same footing as the Flemish culture. I agree wholeheartedly with this idea, and suggest accepting the principle. The final adoption, however, should be delayed for a few years (or more…) to see if the Frenchspeakers not only agree to proposals (a) and (b), but act on them as well. 
III.
Let us return to the three proposals discussed by my commentator:
"In the Flemish communes that surround Brussels, the use of languages should be put to a majority vote by the population of each commune." No, this is not what I propose. More precisely I propose submitting to the majority vote by the population in each commune the alternative for a commune to belong either to a unilingual linguistic region or to a bilingual linguistic region, as these regions are specified in article 4 of the Constitution. Although the linguistic implication is obviously the same, the purpose of the vote is not, for in this case it is an institution that is in question, which considerably expands the purpose of the vote. For the Poles in Chicago, no institutional alternative is proposed. In any case, they do not need one because speaking their language is not subject to ukases, prohibitions and many forms of discriminations experienced by the French-speakers living in the zones surrounding Brussels. The Chicago Pole example is picturesque, but institutionally irrelevant. On the other hand, linguistically speaking, it is consistent with bilingualism, a point on which we obviously concur.
What Victor Ginsburgh proposes instead of abandoning jus soli is actually inspired by the same idea that motivates me as well: making citizens bilingual regardless the language they speak at home. But if this idea is to take shape in a commune on the outskirts of Brussels, is it not better for it to belong to a bilingual, rather than a unilingual, region? In this realm my distinguished colleague's own comments provide me with the decisive argument: in a region that is officially bilingual, institutionally speaking there is no longer a majority or a minority. By law, both languages are on strictly equal footing (as is the case in the Brussels Capital Region). This appears to be the ideal framework for the consensual arrangements he would like to see, rather than the present framework which is forced unilingualism.
As for Mr Ginsburgh's final comment, I agree, as long as points (a) and (b) are rethought along the lines suggested in this reply.
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